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On the feasibility of insurers' investment policies 
Abstract
This article calls attention to a difficulty with insurers' investment policies that seems to have been
overlooked so far. There is the distinct possibility that insurers cannot satisfy the demands of different
stakeholders in terms of expected returns and volatility. While using the capital asset pricing model as
the benchmark, this article distinguishes two groups of stakeholders that impose additional constraints.
One is “income security” in the interest of current beneficiaries and older workers; the other is
“predictability of contributions” in the interest of contributing younger workers and sponsoring
employers. It defines the conditions for which the combination of these constraints results in a lack of
feasibility of investment policy. Minimum deviation from the capital market line is proposed as the
performance benchmark in these situations.
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Abstract 
This paper calls attention to a difficulty with insurers’ investment policies that seems to have 
been overlooked so far. There is the distinct possibility that insurers cannot satisfy the 
demands of different stakeholders in terms of expected returns and volatility. While using the 
CAPM as the benchmark, this paper distinguishes two groups of stakeholders that impose 
additional constraints. One is ‘income security’ in the interest of current beneficiaries and 
older workers, the other, ‘predictability of contributions’ in the interest of contributing 
younger workers and sponsoring employers. It defines the conditions for which the 
combination of these constraints results in a lack of feasibility of investment policy. Minimum 
deviation from the Capital Market Line is proposed as the performance benchmark in these 
situations. 
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On the Feasibility of Insurers’ Investment Policies 
 
1. Introduction and motivation 
The performance of an insurer’s investment policy is crucial for the company’s success with 
its stakeholders, especially in the life and pension business. Therefore, it is astonishing that an 
important difficulty characterizing pensions seems to have been overlooked so far in the 
relevant literature. There is the definite possibility that no investment policy exists that 
simultaneously satisfies the demands of  the different stakeholders in terms of  expected 
returns and volatility. These stakeholders are shareholders, current beneficiaries of pension 
policies, and current contributors and sponsors.  Using the shortfall concept in combination 
with the CAPM, this paper will show that their demands can reduce the set of insurers’ 
feasible investment policies to measure zero, in particular when there is a drop in the funding 
ratio. 
 
The importance of insurers’ investment policy is documented by the experience of the past 
few years. While during the 1990s pension funds were able to please their contributors and 
sponsors with contribution holidays, the end of the bubble in 2000 has caused them to turn 
around, imposing benefit curtailments and contribution hikes. A whole generation of workers 
saw the very cornerstone of their lifetime economic plans shattered.  
The plan of this contribution is as follows. Following the lead of Kraus and Ross (1982), the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is used as the starting point in section 2; however, the 
CAPM is known to neglect the risk tolerance of investors. Risk tolerance will be introduced in 
section 3 through a shortfall constraint indicating the acceptable probability of the rate of 
return on investment falling below a given threshold value. This first shortfall constraint 
reflects the situation especially of all the (current) beneficiaries and older workers who have 
little opportunity to make up for any loss in their pension claims. However, there is still 
another party concerned, addressed in section 4. The employer, acting as a sponsor but also as 
an agent on behalf of younger workers who look forward to a long period of contribution 
payments, are concerned with insureds’ surplus, i.e. excess of assets over liabilities. 
Reflecting this second group of stakeholders, a second shortfall constraint needs to be 
satisfied. Section 5 contains a demonstration that insurers with a low funding ratio cannot 
pursue an investment policy that is feasible in the sense of satisfying both shortfall 
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constraints. At least one of the two groups of stakeholders must be prepared to bear more risk. 
In the concluding section, it is argued that the CAPM continues to provide a useful 
benchmark for insurers’ investment policies in spite of its shortcomings. 
2. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the point of departure 
The CAPM shows the combination of expected rate of return (ROR) and risk (usually 
measured as the variance of ROR), which a firm must offer in order to attract capital and thus 
ensure its economic survival. The model can be applied to a private insurance company or any 
supplier of old age provision instruments that is quoted on the stock exchange. It conforms to 
the view of an insurer as a financial intermediary rather than a production entity [as advanced 
by Brockett et al. (2005); see also MacMinn (2005)].  The basic CAPM formula for some firm 
i is  
( )i f i M fEr r Er rβ= + − ,     with ( ) 0M fEr r− > . (1) 
Here, Eri denotes the expected value of ROR on the equity issued by firm i, rf, the risk-free 
interest rate, βi, the slope of the regression i i i M ir r uα β= + ⋅ + , (ui: stochastic error term), and 
ErM, the expected value of ROR on the capital market. Since most firms’ ROR on equity 
move more or less parallel with ROR on the capital market (βi > 0), equity of firm i makes a 
limited contribution to risk diversification. Accordingly, the corporation must pay its 
shareholders a risk surcharge on the risk-free rate of interest. 
The CAPM can now be modified to be applicable to an insurance company, whose two main 
activities are the underwriting of risks and the investment of capital [for an early application 
incorporating tax issues, see Hill (1979); for a critique from an actuarial point of view, Gold 
(2005)]. The following development follows closely Kraus and Ross (1982), neglecting their 
extension to dynamic cash flows in order to focus on the crucial issue of  feasibility of 
investment policies in view of conflicting stakeholder interests. With regard to capital 
investment, the assumption is that share k (the so-called funds generating factor) of premium 
income is not used up for losses and administrative expense during the period considered and 
thus can be invested. The higher the mean duration of liabilities (i.e. the later losses are settled 
on average), the higher value of k. The company’s equity augmented by this factor can thus be 
invested at an expected ROR equal to ErP, the rate of return on the insurer’s portfolio. The 
contribution of underwriting to expected profit EΠ is (P – EL), with P denoting premium 
income (considered non-stochastic for simplicity) and EL, denoting the discounted expected 
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value of future liabilities. The expected value of profit is therefore given by [see e.g. Zweifel 
and Eisen (2003), ch. 6.2.2] 
( ) ( )PE K kP Er P ELΠ = + + − .       (2) 
The expected ROR on the portfolio (after multiplication by 1 = P/K, where K denotes equity) 
thus amounts to 
: 1K P
E P P EL P
Er k Er
K K P K
Π − = = + + ⋅ 
 
.      (3)  
The difference between premiums received and losses paid plus administrative expense 
relative to premiums is the combined ratio. This quantity is nothing but the ROR on 
underwriting, such that 
:U
P EL
Er
P
−
= .         (4) 
Using (3) and (4), the overall ROR of an insurance company can be written as the weighted 
average of the expected ROR on capital investment and on underwriting of risk, 
1K P U
P P
Er k Er Er
K K
 = + + ⋅ 
 
.       (5) 
The insurer considered must be able to offer investors the same ROR as any arbitrary stock 
company of comparable exposure to risk. Therefore, one has 
( )K f K M fEr r Er rβ= + − .        (6) 
By equating (5) and (6), the expected rate of return (ErP) can be determined that the company 
must attain through its investment policy, 
( )1 P U f K M fP Pk Er Er r Er r
K K
β + ⋅ + ⋅ = + − 
 
.     (7) 
Solving for ErP, one obtains 
( )1
1
P f K M f U
P
Er r Er r Er
P K
k
K
β = + − −  +
.      (8) 
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This condition determines the ROR that an insurer must attain with its investment policy in 
order to be competitive on the capital market. This benchmark value depends on the following 
parameters. 
1) The higher the funds generating factor k, the lower the required value of ErP. The 
longer the lag between premiums received and losses settled, the more time is left for 
generating returns on the capital investment, implying that the returns per period can 
be lower. Conversely, if beneficiaries were to decide to retire earlier than originally 
planned (without any curtailment of benefits EL), k drops, and there is pressure for the 
investment policy to achieve a higher ROR. 
2) The higher the beta of the company (βK), the higher ErP. If the equity of the insurance 
company contributes only little to risk diversification of investors, because it largely 
follows the movements of the capital market (βK high), it must accordingly offer a 
higher risk surcharge on the risk-free rate of interest. This demand calls for an increase 
in the expected ROR to be achieved by the insurer’s investment policy. 
3) The higher the expected ROR in underwriting of risks ErU, the lower ErP. Thus, a 
favorable combined ratio relaxes demands imposed on investment policy. Although 
insurers often fail to achieve a combined ratio of one or more, equation (8) indicates 
that they do not necessarily lack competitiveness on the capital market. It is still 
possible for them to attract investors; however, their investment policy must achieve a 
higher ROR on average. 
Conclusion 1: The CAPM can be used to derive requirements for an insurers’ investment 
policy if quoted on the stock exchange. The expected ROR that must be 
attained decreases with both the funds generating factor and the expected ROR 
on the underwriting business but increases with the beta of the company. 
However, condition (8) also indicates that given unfavorable results in underwriting (ErU < 0), 
there can be a demand on the insurer’s investment policy to exceed the ROR on the capital 
market (ErM). In this situation, the company will be tempted to pursue an active investment 
policy [empirical evidence supporting this notion is presented by Collins et al. (1997); see 
their EARNINGS variable, which corresponds to rU]. This can be achieved in two ways. First, 
it can change the asset allocation defined in terms of the most important categories 
(government bonds, commercial bonds, equity, real property) from their long-run values 
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(market timing). Second, it can increase the weight of particular corporation within a given 
category of stocks (stock picking).  
Yet Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), analyzing the investment performance of pension funds in 
the United States, have found that the ROR of an investment policy is largely determined by 
asset allocation in terms of main categories. Moreover, pension funds seem unable to beat the 
market benchmark through either market timing or stock picking. This seems to hold 
internationally; in the case of Switzerland e.g., Drobetz and Köhler (2002) come to the 
conclusion that pension funds pursuing an active asset allocation policy fell short of a purely 
passive one that sticks to an initial allocation by asset categories. Chances to exceed the 
expected ROR on the capital market by pursuing an active investment policy therefore appear 
to be dim. 
3. Shortfall constraint No. 1: Income security for older workers and retirees 
The insurance-CAPM of equation (8) is incomplete on two accounts: (a) It neglects the fact 
that the investment policy of an insurance company typically is carried out on behalf of 
individuals that do not dispose of fully diversified portfolios. As shown by Brown (1990), this 
fact creates a clientele effect (causing a departure from the Fisher Separation Theorem) in that 
retired beneficiaries exhibit especially marked risk aversion. This is due to an increased 
importance of liquidity constraints which in turn reflect their inability to raise additional 
income. Moreover, (b) the insurance-CAPM does not take into account that employers as 
sponsors as well as most of employees are interested in a smoothing of their contributions (see 
section 4 below for details). Both considerations pose constraints on the insurers’ investment 
policy. This section is devoted to consideration (a). 
In figure 1, the efficient frontier of a portfolio is given by EE’. If there is also an investment 
alternative in a risk-free asset, the investor can attain a point on the capital market line (CML), 
which originates at rf and runs tangential to EE’. This point of tangency M represents the 
market portfolio, i.e. a fully diversified portfolio. The investor’s risk aversion (or conversely, 
risk tolerance) is represented by indifference curves (with expected utilities EU2 > EU1 > 
EU0) that together with CML determine the optimal allocation between risk-free and risky 
assets (point C*). 
This representation reflects the assumption that an unbounded variance or standard error of 
ROR ( rσ ) is acceptable as long as the expected ROR is high enough, in keeping with the 
Fisher Separation Theorem. However, this assumption cannot be maintained for a pension 
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fund. As argued by Brown (1990), clientele effects are to be expected. Indeed, Milligan 
(2005) provides evidence showing that while housing property and consumer durables 
together continue to make up more than one-half of total assets held by Canadian households, 
(the present value of) pension income sharply increases in importance after age 55.  This 
causes an increased risk to retired households of being exposed to liquidity constraints should 
pension income fall. Moreover, beneficiaries who are close to retirement or already receiving 
pension payments cannot make up for an unexpectedly low ROR by paying additional 
contribution. Their future income thus strongly depends on the success of the insurer’s 
investment policy. 
 
Figure 1: Optimal asset allocation, standard case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For incorporating risk aversion of stakeholders, the practitioners of investment counselling 
have been using the shortfall concept [see e.g. Leibowitz et al. (1992) and the literature cited 
there]. The term ‘shortfall’ indicates the likelihood of ROR remaining below a certain 
benchmark value. For example, one standard error away from expected value, this probability 
is 0.165. When both expected value and standard error are doubled (m = 2), the probability of 
shortfall sP remains unchanged at 0.165 under the normality assumption. Generally, one has 
(Cummins and Nye, 1981) 
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( )Pr .P U r Pr mEr m s constσ≤ − ⋅ = =                                                                                       (9) 
For example, in figure 2, ErU = 5% and rσ  = 8% (point B). Therefore, the probability of a 
ROR being -3% or less is sP = 0.165. The shortfall probability is the same for a portfolio with 
ErU = 10% and rσ  = 16% (m = 2, point B’). Thus, the locus of all combinations of expected 
ROR and standard error compatible with a given shortfall probability of sP = 0.165 is the 
straight line AA’.  
  
Figure 2: The shortfall constraint for income security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This locus reflects the first shortfall constraint of an insurers’ investment policy. Above AA’, 
this probability is lower since the higher expected ROR with an unchanged standard error 
shifts the density function of returns towards more favorable outcomes without changing its 
shape. This also means that the boundary AA’ runs higher if the beneficiaries of the pension 
scheme are more risk averse, to the extent that they for example require the shortfall 
probability at the benchmark –3% to be less than 0.165. Accordingly, AA’ would have to go 
through a point like D of figure 2. In the following, the argument is based on the constraint 
‘income security’ to be reflected by the straight line AA’. In that case, point Q* with its mix of 
risky and riskless assets can be said to be optimal from the point of view of beneficiaries, with 
the following properties. 
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1. As can be gleaned from figure 2, the market portfolio M does not qualify as a rule. 
While it does offer a higher expected ROR, it implies a shortfall probability that is not 
acceptable. 
2. Conversely, Q* does not coincide with the original optimum C* of figure 1. This is 
the consequence of the fact that risk aversion is a property relating to the entire density 
or distribution function of a stochastic variable, while the concept of shortfall applies 
only to a segment of the distribution (Hadar and Russell, 1969). 
3. However, a more marked risk aversion does result in a more conservative policy. For 
if the straight line AA’ were to go through point D for example, the point of 
intersection with the capital market line Q* would move towards the origin, i.e. 
towards low values of rσ . 
4. An extremely low probability of shortfall imposed is not compatible with a feasible 
investment policy. In figure 2, AA’ would go through point D’ (for sP = 0.001, e.g.). 
However, this implies that there is no intersection with CML anymore, implying that 
investment policy would have to beat the capital market line, which is not possible on 
the longer run. 
Conclusion 2: If an extremely low shortfall probability is postulated on behalf of retired 
beneficiaries and older workers, the investment policy of the insurer would 
have to beat the capital market line, an impossibility on the longer run. In the 
case of feasible shortfall probabilities, investment policy must change in favor 
of lower volatility, combined with lower expected ROR. 
The difference between Conclusions 2 and 1 is that in Conclusion 1, investment policy is on 
the CML by assumption and is thus feasible. This feasibility can be lost in Conclusion 2 as a 
consequence of the first shortfall constraint on behalf of current beneficiaries and older 
workers who want to have income security.  
 
4. Shortfall constraint No. 2: Smoothing of contributions 
There are stakeholders of a pension scheme who are not primarily interested in the security of 
pension income but rather smoothing (or at least predictability) of contributions to be paid. 
This objective is of importance to at least two groups. One is the younger workers who face 
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the risk of having to pay additional contributions in the case of financial disequilibrium. 
Having invested their human capital (i.e. their dominant component of total assets in most 
cases) with the employer, they are not diversified enough to easily make up for the increased 
financial burden. The alternative for the pension fund would be to curtail payments to retirees, 
a recourse of last resort (for reasons given in section 3). The other stakeholders with an 
interest in contribution predictability and smoothing are employers. This statement of course 
clashes with the theoretical result that a management who acts in the interest of fully 
diversified owners should decide in a risk-neutral manner [see Mayers and Smith (1988)]. 
Thus, predictability and smoothing of contributions should be of no interest to employers 
even though as sponsors they may have to participate in a financial restructuring of the 
scheme. However, there are several reasons for employers to be concerned about 
predictability and smoothing. For one, as shown by Allen et al. (1999), they (and the owners 
of the company) stand to benefit from smoothing for tax reasons. And as soon as management 
is a less than perfect agent of owners, it has a number of reasons to be risk averse with regard 
to  the performance of the pension fund. First, managers may be covered themselves by the 
same fund. Second, inability to come up with additional funding to bail out the fund may get 
them into conflict with special regulation safeguarding the solvency of pension funds. And 
third, since possibly thousands of employees see their old age provision at risk, this inability 
will likely receive news coverage, giving rise to undesirable reputation effects.    
In order to avoid a financial disequilibrium, there must be a surplus of assets (At) over future 
liabilities (Lt). The concept of ‘surplus’ has the advantage compared to ‘capital’ that it leaves 
open the question of its allocation between shareholders and the insured. However, while 
most shareholders of an insurance company are sufficiently diversified for not being too much 
affected by a possible insolvency, employers are far less diversified with regard to employee 
benefit schemes. They therefore will evaluate fluctuations of surplus under the influence of 
risk aversion. This holds even more true of current workers as contributors. 
In order to retain the analogy with capital investment as much as possible, the ROR on surplus 
is defined as follows (Ezra, 1991), 
( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1/
S
S S A A L L
r
A A L A L
− − −
− − − − −
− − −
= = −  
                   
1
P Lr r
F
= − ,   with  1
1
:P
A A
r
A
−
−
−
=   
                                                   
      F: = A-1/L-1  funding ratio    (10)  
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The change of surplus over time therefore is compared with the value of assets in the 
preceding period (subscripts t are dropped for simplicity). The second equality sign relates 
this change to changes in assets (A) and liabilities (L). By multiplying this by  
1 = L-1/L-1, liabilities can be expressed in terms of relative change as well. The relative change 
of the value of assets corresponds to the ROR on the portfolio (rP). In full analogy, the 
relative change in liabilities can be seen as the ROR on liabilities (rL). However, in 
contradistinction to equation (4), current premium income is already accounted for in assets, 
and the expected value of liabilities or payments is not regarded as constant anymore. For this 
reason, the ROR on liabilities rL is not equated to the (negative of) ROR on risk underwriting 
ru. 
Equation (10) shows that the ROR on surplus equals the difference between the ROR of assets 
and liabilities only if F = 1, i.e. if the funding ratio of liabilities over assets in the preceding 
period was exactly 100 percent. If F is below 100 percent, any increase of liabilities serves to 
lower the ROR on surplus rS more than proportionally. Since F is predetermined, it can be 
treated like a constant in the expectation operator, and one obtains 
1
S P LEr Er Er
F
= − , implying  
1
P S LEr Er Er
F
= + .               (11) 
Solving  for ErP, one sees that the ROR of investment policy cannot be set freely anymore as 
soon as the ROR on surplus has to attain a certain value. 
The same considerations with regard to F can be used to calculate the variance of rS, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2
2 1
,S P P L LVar r Var r Cov r r Var r
F F
= − + ,  
implying )(
1
),(
2
)()(
2 LLPSP
rVar
F
rrCov
F
rVarrVar −+= .    (12) 
Solving for Var(rP) indicates again that the variance (standard error Pσ , respectively) of the 
ROR on the investment portfolio is constrained as soon as Var(rS) must satisfy a certain 
condition. Such condition results from the requirement that the ROR on surplus must not 
exceed a certain shortfall probability. In analogy to equation (9), the expected value ErS and 
the standard deviation Sσ  of the ROR of surplus must remain in a fixed proportion for rP not 
to fall short of a certain limit with a given probability (e.g. 0.165% again for an expected 
value ErP of 3 percent and a volatility of 10 percent). 
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The restriction ‘predictability of contributions’ determines not only the set of feasible 
combinations (ErS, ( )Srσ ), but because of (11) and (12) also the combinations (ErP, Pσ ) of 
investment policy. Leibowitz et al. (1992) derive a frontier VV’ in (ErP, Pσ ) -space whose 
relevant portion originates at the level of the risk-free rate of interest rf but ends above rf (see 
figure 3). The shape of this frontier is reminiscent of the efficient frontier EE’ of figure 1. 
This is not surprising because when constructing the efficient frontier, the problem was to 
determine a portfolio that yields the maximum expected value of ROR for a given volatility. 
In figure 3, the predetermined shortfall probability requires that for a given volatility of 
surplus a certain expected value of ROR has to be attained (for a fixed pS = 0.165, e.g.). The 
translation of this requirement into (ErP, Pσ )-space therefore must yield a similar frontier as 
EE’ in figure 1. 
Four properties of this second constraint merit emphasis. 
1.   The frontier VV’ runs below the efficient frontier EE’ (not shown in figure 3), at least 
for realistic values of the shortfall probability. As shown by Berketi (1999) for life 
insurers in the United Kingdom, a smoothing requirement may reduce the expected 
ROR by up to 20 percent. And contrary to the first shortfall constraint, the capital  
Figure 3: Adding the shortfall constraint for predictability and smoothing of 
contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q** 
rf 
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H 
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I 
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market line CML cannot be reached by any feasible investment policy anymore.  This 
difference is due to the fact that the frontier VV’, unlike EE’, is not the result of an 
optimization but satisfies a constraint that emanates from the risk aversion of sponsors 
and contributors. However, if this constraint is relaxed by assuming unrealistically 
high accepted probabilities of shortfall, it becomes possible for VV’ to locally run 
above EE’ and CML. Of course, investment policy is feasible in this case; it would 
simply realize some point on CML that implies a lower probability of shortfall than 
exogenously imposed. 
2. Any frontier of the type VV’ reflects an assumption with regard to the mean duration 
of liabilities, e.g. 10 years. If the duration of assets is chosen to be the same, 
immunization of surplus against risk is achieved. The shortfall probability relating to 
surplus sS is 0 in this case. This causes VV’ to shrink to a point (marked I in figure 3); 
investment policy then results in a specific volatility of the ROR on assets (assumed to 
be 10 percent in figure 3, see Leibowitz et al., 1992). This investment policy is 
feasible but does not attain the capital market line (which may serve as the ultimate 
benchmark, see the concluding section). 
3. Variation of the funding ratio F also greatly modifies the shape of the boundary VV’. 
As equation (11) shows, a smaller value of F  causes the attainable expected ROR on 
surplus to fall. Moreover, it follows from equation (12) that a reduction of F  
dominates the last term sooner or later; as a consequence, the variance of ROR on 
surplus must increase. These two effects in combination make the restriction 
‘predictability of contributions’ more binding.  As shown by Leibowitz et al. (1992), 
the feasibility set defined by VV’ shrinks; moreover, VV’ also moves away from the 
origin. The reason for this second shift is that in order to be able to attain a higher 
ROR as indicated by equation (12), a much higher degree of volatility must be 
accepted. In all, the insurer’s investment policy increasingly falls short of the capital 
market line when the funding ratio falls.  
4. If sponsors and beneficiaries impose a lower shortfall probability at the rP threshold  
(-3 percent as before), then VV’ would have to run through a point like H. Therefore, it 
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would move downwards and tighter. In this case, the capital market line cannot be 
attained anymore either.  
 
Conclusion 3:  Imposing a shortfall probability on the surplus is above all in the interest of 
younger contributors and sponsors. While the investment policy remains 
feasible in principle, its performance falls short of the capital market line 
especially if the funding ratio becomes low.  
5. Combining the two shortfall constraints  
This section is devoted to the characterization of an insurer’s investment policy that seeks to 
satisfy both ‘income security for older workers and retirees’ and ‘predictability of 
contributions’. The set of feasible policies is represented by the shaded area in figure 3. Each 
point of the area corresponds to a mix of equity and fixed income securities, resulting in the 
pertinent combination of expected ROR and volatility of ROR.  These points lie above the 
straight line AA’, where the probability of shortfall regarding the portfolio ROR is 16.5% or 
less. They also lie below the boundary VV’, where the probability of shortfall regarding the 
surplus ROR is 16.5% or less.  
Now an investment policy strictly in the interest of current beneficiaries and older workers 
(‘income security’) would prescribe moving on the line AA’ as far as possible towards the 
capital market line CML, optimally reaching point  Q** . Typically, it would be even more 
conservative (i.e. with smaller variance of portfolio ROR and hence smaller share of equities) 
than if the restriction ‘predictability of contributions’ could be disregarded (point Q*). 
Conversely, the pursuit of a policy merely in the interest of the sponsors would result in a 
movement along the VV’ boundary towards the capital market line CML.  Depending on the 
precise shape of VV’, this can again result in point Q** or some point between V und Q**. In 
the latter case, investment policy would become still more conservative than the alternative 
attuned to ‘income security’.  
However, there is no guarantee for the solution set to be nonempty. As shown in Conclusion 
1, an extremely low shortfall probability imposed on the portfolio ROR already suffices to 
undermine the feasibility of the insurer’s investment policy (the boundary AA’ running above 
the capital market line). This danger becomes relevant especially when policy has to satisfy 
both shortfall constraints. It is the greater (see figure 3), 
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- the lower the value of the shortfall probability with regard to the portfolio ROR that is 
accepted by older workers and current beneficiaries;  
- the lower the shortfall probability with regard to surplus ROR that is accepted by 
current contributors and sponsors;   
- the lower the funding ratio F.  
 
After a rate of return on global investments in equity of almost 15 percent in 1999, ROR 
plunged to –9 percent in 2000 and even –11 percent in 2001, with only a partial recovery to  
–3 percent in 2002. This was not balanced by bond performances of –4 percent, 4 percent, 2 
percent, and 15 percent, respectively (MSCI, 2005), causing the funding ratio of U.S. pension 
funds to drop to 0.81 in 2002 (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 2004). Even though 
equity markets have since recovered somewhat, low funding ratios create a big difficulty for 
insurers’ investment policy: Possibly, there simply does not exist a policy anymore that 
satisfies the requirements of both current and imminent beneficiaries on the one hand and of 
contributors and sponsors on the other.   
Several strategies for solving this problem are available. The first is for the insurer to simply 
point out that a series of years with low portfolio ROR is still compatible with the selected 
shortfall probability. Although basically correct, this argument is unlikely to be credible with 
the interested public (indeed, this quandary illustrates the basic weakness of the shortfall 
concept).  Next, the insurer may admit to the tension between the requirements imposed on its 
investment policy but suggest living with it. However, this typically runs into difficulties 
because current beneficiaries and older workers both push for a conservative investment 
policy (as indicated by point Q* of figure 3 as soon as the constraint VV’ can be disregarded). 
Contributors and sponsors in their turn will urge the insurer to pursue a more risky policy (this 
would mean a shift of the boundary VV’ away from the origin of figure 3).   
A third strategy is to reverse the drop of the funding ratio. One way to achieve this 
immediately is for the insurer to curtail its liabilities by partly reneging on the claims of 
current beneficiaries. Such a measure has the important drawback of disappointing 
expectations held by an entire generation of workers, who have few opportunities to make up 
for their loss of income. Alternatively, the insurer may reduce liabilities incurred with future 
beneficiaries. Since the drop of the portfolio ROR is the cause of the problem, the measure of 
choice is to decrease the guaranteed rate of interest with which contributions are credited. For 
instance, in 2003 Swiss life insurers were successful in getting the government to lower this 
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guaranteed rate from 3.5 to 3 percent p.a.  This serves to restore a measure of flexibility to 
insurers’ investment policy at least with regard to younger contributors and sponsors (the VV’ 
boundary of figure 3 is shifted up and out towards the capital market line CML).  
A fourth strategy aims at relaxing the constraints imposed on the insurer’s investment policy. 
However, current beneficiaries are unlikely to accept a higher shortfall probability, which 
would translate into an increased volatility of their incomes (which they have difficulty to 
counteract). By way of contrast, sponsors and younger contributors (who have more 
opportunity to adjust) may buy the argument that recent experience shows that there will 
always be a nonzero probability of shortfall and that investment policy cannot be successful 
unless the pertinent benchmark is lowered.   
Similar as they may seem, these strategies are not equivalent with regard to one important 
aspect. As long as insurance companies administer pension funds on their own account, their 
investors are affected by the choice of policy. The CAPM application laid out in section 2 
shows that the insurer must pursue an investment policy that attains the capital market line of 
figure 1 in order to act in the investors’ interest.  However, satisfying merely the constraint 
‘security of income’ in favor of older workers and current beneficiaries has the decisive 
advantage of permitting the capital market line to be reached (point Q* of figure 3). 
Conversely, respecting the constraint ‘predictability of contributions’ while neglecting the 
other, the insurer does not have a guarantee to be on CML, especially if its funding ratio F is 
low (see Conclusion 3).  
Conclusion 4: Especially in the case of a drop in the funding ratio, the feasibility of an 
investment policy designed to satisfy both the constraints ‚income security’ and 
‘predictability of contributions’ is not assured. Moreover, the strategies 
available for dealing with this problem are not equivalent with regard to the 
insurer’s competitiveness on the market for capital. 
6. Final remarks 
Public interest in insurers’ investment policies is intense because their performance has very 
immediate consequences for the income and welfare of both beneficiaries and contributors. 
Interestingly, what seems to have been overlooked so far is the distinct possibility that there is 
no investment policy that simultaneously satisfies the demands of those two groups of 
stakeholders. While the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) provides a first benchmark of 
performance, it appears to be insufficient because of its neglect of risk aversion on the part of 
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current beneficiaries, many of whom lack the wealth and expertise necessary for risk 
diversification. It also neglects possible risk aversion on the part of sponsors, who are not 
much diversified in terms of their liabilities accruing through their pension funds. Subject to 
the constraints imposed by these two clienteles, insurers’ investment policies may well run 
into problems especially when the funding ratio (i.e. the ratio of assets to liabilities carried 
over from the previous period) is low. The competing requirements imposed by the 
stakeholders simply cannot be satisfied anymore in this situation.  
One solution to this dilemma could be to win the consent of sponsors and contributing 
workers to assume more risk by accepting a higher probability of shortfall with regard to the 
rate of return on the surplus of the scheme.  Being risk averse, these stakeholders will have to 
find their new optimum in terms of risk and expected return, which may well call for a costly 
restructuring of their remaining assets and liabilities. This is likely to meet with resistance and 
even protest as well. For measuring the insurer’s performance in pursuing this strategy, the 
distance of the risk-return combination achieved from the capital market line (CML in figure 
3) may serve as the indicator. In this way, the CAPM approach remains useful for 
benchmarking in spite of its imperfections noted in the introductory section. 
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